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INTERPRETING THE RATIFIERS' INTENT: THE
BURGER COURT'S ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE RECONSIDERED IN
THE LIGHT OF ERIE RAILROAD
V. TOMPKINS
Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their symbols with free-
dom of revision must ultimately decay, either from anarchy or from slow
atrophy of a life stifled by useless shadows.'
INTRODUCTION
Many critics of the Supreme Court have argued that the Court must
examine the intention of the Framers and the Ratifiers of the United
States Constitution in order to determine its meaning.2 The Burger
Court attempted this in its eleventh amendment cases3 wherein it repeat-
edly held that the eleventh amendment provided the states with sover-
eign immunity from any individual's federal suit even though the text of
the amendment did not so require. The Court based its decisions on the
history of the ratification period and on the statements of James
Madison, John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton.4 By its rulings the
Court purported to maintain the balance between state and federal gov-
ernment that the founders intended.5
This Note explores the problems of determining the Framers' and Ra-
tifiers' intent within the specific context of these Burger Court eleventh
amendment cases. This Note argues that the Court erred when it did not
interpret the Ratifiers' statements in light of the decision of Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins. Then, using the eleventh amendment cases as a starting
point, this Note proposes a four-step process for incorporating the Ra-
tifiers' debates into constitutional interpretation.
1. A.N. Whitehead, quoted in Reston, Not 1776 but 1789, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1976, § 4, at 11,
col. 1.
2. See generally, R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); R. BERGER, FEDERAL-
ISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
3. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
4. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 660.
5. As then Justice Rehnquist stated in Edelman, the eleventh amendment cases represent "one
of the more dramatic efforts by the Court to derive meaning [from the Constitution]." Id.
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Specifically, Part I reviews the background of the eleventh amendment
cases and the Erie decision. Part II outlines the Burger Court's historical
sources and compares them with other documents from that period.
Part III critiques the Burger Court's use of the Ratifiers' language and
constitutional history. Part IV argues that the Court erred in failing to
recognize the relevance of Erie in its interpretation of the Ratifiers' state-
ments. Part V proposes a model for determining the relevancy of the
Ratifiers' statements in constitutional interpretation and then applies the
model to the eleventh amendment.
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, ERIE, AND
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
A. 4 Review of the Eleventh Amendment
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution extends the fed-
eral judicial power in part to controversies "between a State and Citizens
of another State" (the "state/citizen diversity clause").6 In the 1793 de-
cision of Chisholm v. Georgia7 the Supreme Court ruled that this section
gave the Court jurisdiction over a South Carolina citizen's suit to recover
a debt from the state of Georgia.' In response to the decision, Congress
proposed and the states ratified the eleventh amendment:
6. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
7. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
8. The traditional, but erroneous, account of Chisholm is that Chisholm instituted the suit on
behalf of a British creditor. In fact, Chisholm represented the estate of Robert Farquhar, a South
Carolinian from whom the state of Georgia had purchased war supplies in 1777. C. JACOBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 4647 (1972). Charles Warren relying on an
erroneous newspaper report, authored the incorrect view of the case. I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 93 n.l (rev. ed. 1937). Under the contract between Georgia
and Farquhar the State agreed to pay almost $170,000 for merchandise for the American troops near
Savannah. He never received a cent. Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpreta-
tion, 2 GA. L. REV. 207, 217-218 (1968).
The Court ruled 4-1 in favor of exercising jurisdiction and each judge issued a separate opinion.
Justice James Iredell, the lone dissenter, argued that although the Constitution permitted the suit,
the Court should not have exercised jurisdiction because Congress had not expressly implemented
the state/citizen diversity clause in Article III § 2. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 432-39.
In rejecting Iredell's approach, Justice James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention,
stated:
A state, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest State, like a dishonest merchant
willfully refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court of Justice. Upon general
principles of right, shall the former when summoned to answer the fair demands of its
creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a new appearance, and to insult him and
justice, by declaring I am a sovereign State? Surely not.
Id. at 456.
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The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
9
The text of the amendment's prohibition does not extend to a citizen's
federal question10 suit against a state. In Louisiana v. JumelI1 and Ha-
good v. Southern 12 the Court held that the federal courts did not possess
jurisdiction over federal causes of action brought against states by citi-
zens of another state or by aliens. In the 1890 decision of Hans v. Louisi-
ana 11 the Court ruled that a citizen could not sue his own state in federal
court for the state's violation of federal law without the state's consent. 4
In Hans the Court cited statements of James Madison, John Marshall,
and Alexander Hamilton. The Court concluded from these statements
that the Ratifiers of the Constitution believed that states were immune
from suits in the federal courts even though the Constitution conferred
jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases between states and citizens of
another state or foreign states.15 The Hans Court stated that the decision
in Chisholm 16 created such a shock of surprise that the states passed the
eleventh amendment thereby constitutionalizing the rule of state sover-
eign immunity.'I
Eighteen years later the Court adopted an important exception to the
9. The Senate passed the resolution proposing the eleventh amendment on January 14, 1794,
and the House approved it on March 4, 1794. Early in 1798 President John Adams notified the
Congress that twelve states had passed the amendment and that it was effective. JACOBS, supra note
8, at 66-67.
10. The federal question jurisdiction is contained in the clause which states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority....
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. An examination of what cases "arise under" federal law is beyond the
scope of this note. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 850-917 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinaf-
ter HART AND WECHSLER]; C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 90-113 (4th ed.
1983) [hereinafter WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS].
11. 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
12. 117 U.S. 52 (1886).
13. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 12-14.
16. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying
text.
17. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
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Hans rule in Ex Parte Young.1 8 In this case the Court ruled that a suit to
enjoin a state official from acting pursuant to an unconstitutional state
law did not constitute a suit against the state because a state could not
authorize unconstitutional conduct."
Under Chief Justice Warren Burger the Supreme Court used eleventh
amendment sovereign immunity principles to reinforce its decentralized
view of state-federal relations.2° In Edelman v. Jordan,21 the Court lim-
ited Ex Parte Young to actions seeking prospective injunctive relief and
forbade the award of retrospective monetary relief. In Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Haldeman,22 the Court ruled that the federal
courts could not exercise pendent jurisdiction over several citizens' state
law claims against their state officials. In other cases the Court recog-
nized that only Congress holds the power to abrogate state immunity
under the fifth section of fourteenth amendment, 23 and it required that
Congress state this intention unequivocally. 24 Additionally, although a
state may waive its immunity, the state must clearly pronounce that its
waiver applies to suits instituted in federal courts.
25
18. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Young, shareholders of a railroad company brought suit against the
Attorney General of Minnesota to enjoin him from enforcing a note-fixing law which substantially
reduced the rates the railroads could charge. Id. at 127.
19. Id. at 159-60.
20. Lee, Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of History, 18 URn. LAW.
519, 547 (1986).
21. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
22. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
23. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
24. See, eg., Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242, (1985) ("[C]ongress) may
abrogate the State's constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statue.").
25. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court stated that it would only find a
waiver:
where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the
text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.... The mere fact that a
State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance
for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent
on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts.
Id. at 673 (citations omitted). In Edelman, the Court ruled that Illinois' acceptance of federal funds
under the program of Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled did not constitute a waiver of immunity in
private actions brought to enforce the Act. See also Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative
Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assoc., 450 U.S. 1147 (1981) (state statute authorizing suits
against a state department does not constitute waiver to actions in federal rather than state courts);
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. (1985) (state constitutional provision authorizing
suits against the state held inapplicable to suits in federal courts).
The Court's decisions have led to a proliferation of lawsuits testing when a state has consented and
what the scope of prospective relief is. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
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In these decisions the Burger Court relied on its view of the history of
the Constitution's passage and the Ratifiers' intent26 for the rule that the
eleventh amendment enumerated a constitutional principle of state sover-
eign immunity.27 One Court member viewed the eleventh amendment
jurisprudence as "one of the more dramatic examples of [the] Court's
effort to derive meaning from the document given to the Nation by the
[Framers]." 2 In these decisions the Court relied on the same statements
of Madison, Marshall and Hamilton as the Hans Court had.2 9 The state-
ments represented the Burger Court's historical justification for a consti-
tutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity.
A number of commentators have criticized the Burger Court's histori-
cal review.3" Additionally, in the case of Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon,3" Justice Brennan issued a lengthy dissent challenging the ma-
jority's historical conclusions about state sovereign immunity.32 Justice
Brennan concluded that "[tihere is no constitutional principle of state
sovereign immunity, and no constitutionally mandated policy of exclud-
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1983). See also the cases collected
in 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDIC-
TION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3524 (2d ed. 1984).
26. As used in this Note, the term "ratifier" denotes a member of one of the state conventions
which voted to adopt the Constitution composed at the Philadelphia Convention and transmitted to
the Continental Congress on September 17, 1787.
27 An extensive review of the history of sovereign immunity is beyond the scope of this Note.
Generally, the principle of sovereign immunity is that a government is immune from suit absent its
consent. For a discussion of the concept of sovereign immunity in the colonial period, see Gibbons,
supra note 25, at 1895-97 and the materials cited therein.
28. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.). See also Atascadero State Hos-
pital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238 n.2 ("We believe, however, that our Eleventh Amendment doctrine
is necessary to support the view of the federal system held by the Framers of the Constitution.");
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 99 (1984) ("Our reluctance to infer
that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of
the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.").
29. See, e.g. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 660-62 n.9 (1974).
30. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 25; Lee, supra note 20; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrine: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1978); Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suits Upon the
States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978); Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amend-
ment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
31. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
32. Id. at 247-302. Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice
Brennan's opinion extensively examined the records of the ratifying convention, the views of various
pamphleteers for and against the Constitution and the circumstances surrounding the passage of the
eleventh amendment.
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ing suits against States from federal courts." 33
B. Erie and Diversity Jurisdiction
Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution confers the judicial
power in part to:
Controversies between two or more states;-between a State and Citizens
of another State;-between Citizens of different States; ... [and] between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.34
As noted above, Chisholm and the eleventh amendment arose out of the
state/citizen diversity clause.35 In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,36 however,
the Court examined the citizen/citizen diversity clause. In Erie, the
Supreme Court overturned Swift v. Tyson 37 and held that in suits "be-
tween Citizens of different States" the federal courts must apply the sub-
stantive state statutory and common law as rules of decision. 38 Federal
law, though, still governed rules of procedure. 39 Under the reign of Swift
the federal courts had been free to fashion a federal common law in place
of state law.4
Justice Louis Brandeis, writing for the Court in Erie, declared that
Swift v. Tyson was "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the
Courts of the United States."41 He went on to say that "in applying the
[Swift] doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights that
in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states."42
Some writers criticized this constitutional ruling in Erie because Justice
Brandeis never explicitly stated which section of the Constitution the
courts had violated.4 3 Indeed, his writing perplexed several of his breth-
ren. 4 Today most writers accept that Erie has a constitutional basis but
33. Id. at 259.
34. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
35. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
37. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
38. 304 U.S. at 79-80.
39. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
40. For a discussion of the rule of Swift and the types of decision which federal courts made
under that case see 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: JURISDICTION § 4502 (1982) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER]. See also, T.
FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE 45-100 (1981).
41. 304 U.S. at 79-80.
42. Id.
43. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 40, § 4505 at 46.
44. Justice Reed, concurring specially, voiced disapproval of the constitutional holding. 304
[Vol. 66:135
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss1/10
RATIFIERS' INTENT & BURGER COURT
differ as to just what that basis is.45 This Note follows the view that Erie
rests upon the theory that Congress and the courts have only the powers
delegated to them in the Constitution. The tenth amendment simultane-
ously reserves all other powers to the states and to the people.46 Thus,
the Constitution requires the courts to apply state law: the Constitution
never delegated to Congress the power to confer to the federal courts a
right to create state law in diversity actions, and even if it did confer the
power Congress never exercised it.
Although the Court decided Erie in the context of the citizen/citizen
clause, the case rule applies in all diversity actions except those between
two states. 7 The federal courts in fact will usually apply state law in any
case where it serves as the source of that litigant's rights.48
II. THE RATIFIERS, HISTORY AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Burger Court's View of History and the Ratifiers' Statements
The Burger Court's eleventh amendment decisions reflect the view that
the Ratiflers of the Constitution did not wish to extend the judicial power
in Article III to suits against unconsenting states.49 The Court drew this
conclusion from statements of James Madison and John Marshall at the
Virginia Ratifying Convention and from Alexander Hamilton's The Fed-
eralist No. 81.50 The Court reasoned that these three statements repre-
U.S. at 91-2. Justice Stone later referred to the language as "unfortunate dicta." 19 WRIGHT
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 40, § 4505 at 45 n.7.
45. See Id. at 51-52 n.31.
46. 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 40, § 4505 at 53-4. See also, Friendly, In
Praise of ERIE-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 396 (1964).
47. 19 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 40 § 4505 at 53-4.
48. Id. § 4515.
49. Pennhurst State Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 98. See also Ex Parte New York, 256
U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace au-
thority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a state without consent given ... .
50. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 660 n.9 in which the Court stated:
While the debates of the Constitutional Convention themselves do not disclose a discussion
of the question [of state immunity], the prevailing view at the time of ratification of the
Constitution was stated by various of the Framers in the writings and debates of the period.
(emphasis added).
The Court then quoted Madison, Marshall and Hamilton. See supra notes 22-26, and accompanying
text.
The Court stated its view of the history surrounding the eleventh amendment most thoroughly in
Edelman. In its decisions after Edelman, the Burger Court majorities stated the broad principle that
states were immune from suit and simply cited Edelman or Hans for historical support, e.g., Pen-
nhurst, 465 U.S. at 98; Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238 and n.2. Therefore, this
Note focuses on Edelman as demonstrative of the Burger Court's use of historical sources.
19881
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sented the positions of all the Ratifiers and concluded that Chisholm v.
Georgia did indeed "literally shock the Nation" into passing the eleventh
amendment.5 1 Therefore, the Court concluded, although the amendment
addressed only the specific holding in Chisholm, it exemplified the broad
and accepted rule of state sovereign immunity from suit.
52
In Edelman v. Jordan,53 the Court most plainly detailed its view of
eleventh amendment history. Justice Rehnquist's opinion, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White and Powell joined, ex-
cerpted Madison's and Marshall's statements with little adornment. The
Court stated that Madison believed that the article III provision confer-
ring jurisdiction over controversies between the States and foreign States
to the federal courts54 only operated where both parties consented. The
Court quoted Madison:
The next case provides for disputes between a foreign state and one of our
states, should such a case ever arise; and between a citizen and a foreign
citizen or subject. I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be de-
cided, in these courts, between an American state and a foreign state, with-
51. The Burger Court's source for the "profound shock" theory and indeed for all its historical
assertions is I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 92-102 (rev. ed.
1937) [hereinafter WARREN]. Even though Edelman cited Warren only one time, a comparison of
the opinion's language with Warren's text clearly shows that Warren's writing exerted a strong
influence on the Court.
Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority cited Warren:
The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and to adjudicate its
rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and of active debate at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any such right had been
disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Government, and it
was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the existence of such Federal
power that the Constitution was finally adopted.
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 660, (citing 1 WARREN, supra, at 91). Justice Rehnquist continued that "de-
spite such disclaimers" the first suit entered in the Supreme Court at its 1791 Term was a suit against
a state and that additional suits against states were causing "considerable alarm and consternation in
the country." 415 U.S. at 660-662. Warren had used almost the exact same language. 1 WARREN
at 91-92 ("Yet in spite of all such disclaimers, the very first suit entered in the Court at its February
Term in 1791 was brought against [a state. This suit and others] aroused great alarm .. "). Justice
Rehnquist also described Chisholm incorrectly as a suit brought by two executors of a British credi-
tor. 415 U.S. at 662. Warren himself was the author of this view. See supra note 8.
52. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238 ("[T]he significance of this Amend-
ment lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of
judicial authority in Article III of the Constitution.") (citation omitted).
53. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
54. The relevant constitutional text provides that the judicial power extends to controversies
"between a state, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONsT. art.
III, § 2.
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out the consent of the parties. If they consent, provision is here made.55
According to the Court, Marshall expressed a similar view. He stated:
"If a foreign state brought a suit against the commonwealth of Virginia,
would she not be barred from the claim if the federal judiciary thought it
unjust? The previous consent of the parties is necessary; and, as the fed-
eral judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce."'56 The Court never
explained how these statements justified the conclusion that states were
immune from suits by their own or foreign citizens accusing the state of
violating federal law. 7
The Burger Court also cited Alexander Hamilton. Unlike Madison
and Marshall, Hamilton directly addressed the question of state immu-
nity. In The Federalist No. 81 he stated:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and general prac-
tice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty,
is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.58
Unless the Constitution forced this surrender of immunity, Hamilton
reasoned, the immunity "[would] remain with the State."59 Hamilton
concluded that the Constitution did not require such a surrender. There-
fore, he wrote, "[t]he contracts between a nation and individuals are only
binding on the conscience of sovereign, and have no pretensions to a
compulsive force."'
According to the Burger Court these statements represented the "pre-
vailing view at the time of the ratification."61 This belief in sovereign
immunity accounted for the shock the country felt about the decision in
55. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 660 n.9 (citing 3 THE DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S
DEBATES]).
56. Id. (citing 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES at 557).
57. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234 (1985).
58. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 661 n.9 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 660 n.9. In this pronouncement, the Court failed to consider the reliability of the
sources on which it relied, specifically ELLIOT'S DEBATES. In a recent article Dr. James Hutson, the
Chief of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress questioned Elliot's purposes for publish-
ing the Debates. He also pointed out the deficiencies of the reporters of the state conventions. Hut-
son, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1,
12-24 (1986).
1988]
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Chisholm v. Georgia6 2 and led to the ratification of the eleventh
amendment.
B. The Ratifiers' Statements and Chisholm in Context
The Burger Court interpreted the history of the ratification of the con-
stitution and of the adoption of the eleventh amendment so as to require
a rule of state sovereign immunity. This view rested primarily on two
critical historical conclusions. First, the Court accepted the statements
of Marshall, Madison and Hamilton as stating the prevailing view of the
Ratifiers.63 Second, the Court accepted the theory that Chisholm v. Geor-
gia stunned the nation into rapidly adopting the eleventh amendment.'
Implicitly, the Court identified the source of this profound shock as being
a generally accepted belief that the federal courts could not possess juris-
diction over a state without its consent.65
In order to explore the validity of these two historical assertions, this
section examines the context in which Marshall, Madison and Hamilton
delivered their statements and explores alternative reasons for the rapid
passage of the eleventh amendment.
L The Virginia Ratifying Convention
To the Ratifiers, the concept of two coexisting sovereigns defied expla-
nation.66 Madison stated that the new government was "a system hith-
erto without a model" and "a nondescript, to be tested and explained by
itself alone."'67 In debating the concept of dual sovereignty the members
of the Virginia Ratifying Convention examined the state/citizen diversity
clause: "The judicial power shall extend to [controversies] between a
state and citizens of another state [and] between a state, or the citizen
thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects."' 68 The Virginia Ratifiers
focused on this clause more extensively than the members of any other
state convention.69 The debate over the state/citizen diversity clause
62. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). For a discussion of this case see supra notes 7-8 and accompa-
nying text.
63. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 47.
65. See supra note 48.
66. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1067.
67. Id. at 1068, (citing J. MADISON, ON NULLIFICATION, in 4 LETrERS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 420-21 (1865)).
68. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
69. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1049. When the Virginia Convention convened, eight of the
[Vol. 66:135
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centered on two issues.
The first issue concerned a series of western Virginia land grants which
King George III had conveyed to a private company in 1768. In 1779
the Virginia legislature voided the conveyance, and the shareholders of
the company had since been demanding that the state compensate their
loss.70 The second issue involved the Peace Treaty of 1783. Article IV of
the agreement prohibited both the British and American governments
from impeding creditors' recovery of valid debts. Article VI meanwhile
forbade all future escheats of loyalist property in America. 71 Like most
of the states, Virginia had incurred substantial debts both before and dur-
ing the war which it did not have the resources to repay. Furthermore,
the enormous estate of Lord Fairfax had escheated to the state after the
signing of the treaty.72
George Mason, a member of the Philadelphia Constitutional Conven-
tion, led Virginia's antifederalists in opposing the federal plan. 3 In dis-
necessary nine states had ratified the Constitution. The importance of Virginia's ratification cannot
be underestimated. Virginia possessed one-fifth of the nation's population and most of the country's
best-known leaders. If the state chose not to join or if it wavered, New York, whose convention had
not yet met, would most likely have followed its lead. C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA
293-95 (1966) [hereinafter BOWEN]. For a brief review of several other states which examined arti-
cle III, § 2, see Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1902-03 (Pennsylvania); 1908-12 (New York); 1912-14
(North Carolina). For the sake of clarity and precision, this Note focuses on the Virginia debates.
70. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1904. This dispute did reach the Supreme Court but not before
the passage of the eleventh amendment required its dismissal. See Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3.
Dall.) 320 (1796) dismissed sum. nom. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). See
also Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 262 (1985) (Brennan J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the anti-federalists' fear that non-citizens would hall the states into federal courts).
71. The Peace Treaty plays a paramount role in Judge Gibbons' examination of the eleventh
amendment. In addition to the requirements of articles IV and VI, article VII required the British to
evacuate all military posts within American territory and to leave behind all slaves. The British did
not act accordingly. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1900. The Americans responded to the British non-
compliance in their own turn. Many states imposed additional obstacles to British creditors' efforts
to collect debts. Id. at 1901. Judge Gibbons states that a desire to create an enforcement mechanism
for the treaty provided a major impetus for the Philadelphia Convention. He argues that because the
Treaty required enforcement against the states, the theory that the Ratifiers of the Constitution
believed that states were immune from suit is incorrect. Id. at 1902.
72. Id. at 1905. The land dispute culminated in the.case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
73. Mason had refused to support the Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention. He feared
the institution of a powerful central government. BOWEN, supra note 69, at 261-62. Mason also
authored the Virginia Bill of Rights which served as a model for many states and for the federal
government. See generally H.S. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON 217-23 (1977) [hereinafter
COMMAGER]. Compare Mason's statements at the Virginia Convention with a provision he wrote in
the Virginia Bill of Rights: "[A]U men.., have certain rights, of which, when they enter into a state
of society they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity." COMMAGER at 220.
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cussing that part of article III, section 2 which conferred federal
jurisdiction to all cases arising under treaties, Mason stated that "[t]his is
one of the powers which ought to be given them."74 At the same time, of
the British creditors he said:
Everyone [knows] that I always spoke for the payment of British debts. I
wish every honest debt to be paid. Though I would wish to pay the British
creditor, yet I would not put it in his power to gratify private malice to our
injury. 7 5
Mason examined the state/citizen diversity clause and asked, "How will
their jurisdiction in this case do?" He warned the convention that claims
concerning the western lands would be brought against the state.76 He
stated:
What is to be done if a judgment be obtained against a state? Will you issue
a fieri facias? It would be ludicrous to say that you could put the state's
body in jail. How is the judgment, then, to be enforced? A power which
cannot be executed ought not to be granted.77
Finally Mason argued that the state/citizen clause would "prostrate"
state legislatures.78
In responding to Mason's objections, James Madison79 stated that the
74. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 523.
75. Id. at 526.
76. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 70-72 for a discussion of the western Virginia
land claims.
77. Id. at 527. Mason's statement left open one important question: What if the power could
be executed? At the time of the ratification and for many years after the federal government was
weak. But today the federal government, with its immense resources and its ability to cut payments
in state programs, could in reality coerce a state into answering a judgment.
78. Id. at 527. Mason stated,
There is a confusion in this case. This much, however, may be raised out of it-that a suit
will be brought against Virginia. She may be sued by a foreign state. What reciprocity is
there in it? In a suit between Virginia and a foreign state, is the foreign state to be bound
by the decision? Is there a similar privilege given to us in foreign states? Where will you
find a parallel regulation? How will the decision be enforced? Only by the ultima ratio
regum. A dispute between a foreign citizen or subject and a Virginian cannot be tried in
our own courts, but must be decided in the federal court. Is this the case in any other
country? Are not men obliged to stand by the laws of the country where the disputes are?
This is an innovation which is utterly unprecedented and unheard-of. Cannot we trust the
state courts with disputes between a Frenchman, or an Englishman, and a citizen; or with
disputes between two Frenchmen? This is disgraceful; it will annihilate your state judici-
ary: it will prostrate your legislature.
Id.
79. Madison, often called the "Father of the Constitution," was something less than that. A
delegate from Pennsylvania, Gouverneur Morris, in fact Wrote the Constitution based upon the vari-
ous drafts in the Convention. BOWEN, supra note 69, at 234-42. Madison also sat on the Committee
of Style and Arrangement which drafted the text of the Constitution but he acknowledged that the
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Supreme Court should be the final arbiter of treaties.80 He answered Ma-
son's attack on the state/citizen diversity clause by stating "[it is not in
the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only operation
it can have is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen,
it must be brought before the federal court.""1 Madison replied to Ma-
son's criticisms of the state/citizen diversity clause by stating that the
provision conferred jurisdiction only if the parties consented. 2
Madison's response came in the context of the dispute over the western
lands.
Patrick Henry, another strident anti-federalist, did not find Madison's
defense of article III plausible.83 He argued
As to controversies between a state and the citizens of another state,
[Madison's] construction of it is to me perfectly incomprehensible. He says
it will seldom happen that a state has demands on individuals. There is
nothing to warrant such an assertion. But he says that the state may be
plaintiff only. If the gentlemen prevent the most clear expression, and the
usual meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of all argu-
ment. What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of controversies
between a state and citizens of another, without discriminating between
plaintiff and defendant.8 4
John Marshall rose to defend the Constitution from Henry's attack.
He argued that the national interest dictated that the federal courts pos-
'finish given to the style and arrangement ... fairly belongs to the pen of Mr. Morris." Id. at 242
(emphasis added). This is not to belittle Madison's achievements, but only to suggest that there are
several authoritative sources for determining the Constitution's meanings.
80. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES at 532.
81. Id. at 533.
82. Id. This is the portion of Madison's speeches that the Burger Court quoted. See supra note
55 and accompanying text.
83. Henry was no friend of Madison, Washington, or any other federalist. Although named to
attend the Philadelphia convention, he refused to attend, saying he "smelt a rat." BOWEN, supra
note 69, at 18. Compare Henry's statements at the Virginia Convention with one he declaimed in
1775, that "the distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers and New Englanders
are no more." COMMAGER, supra note 70, at 162, (quoting W.W. HENRY, 1 PATRICK HENRY: LIFE
CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 266 (1891)).
84. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES at 543. In part by drawing on Madison's statement and Henry's
rebuttal Professor Fletcher concluded that the drafters only intended for article III to confer juris-
diction in state/citizen diversity suits where the state was a plaintiff. The eleventh amendment,
therefore, only confirmed that narrow intention and did not prohibit federal question suits against
the states by a citizen of that state or by a citizen of another state, a foreigner, or an alien. Fletcher,
supra note 30, at 1035. Justice Brennan has also reached this conclusion with the concurrences of
Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens. Atascadero State Hospital, 473 U.S. at 301-02 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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sess jurisdiction of cases arising under the Constitution and Laws of the
United States."5 According to Marshall, the state/citizen diversity clause
only enabled states to bring suits as plaintiffs "to recover claims of indi-
viduals residing in other states."81 6 He also claimed that the state/citizen
clause required the previous consent of the parties.8 7
Governor Edmund Randolph, a member of the Committee of Detail at
the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, also discussed article III,
section 2.88 Although he had not supported the Constitution at the Phil-
adelphia Convention, he changed positions at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention. 9 Before debate over article III began in earnest he stated,
"I admire that part which forces Virginia to pay for her debts."90 He
later referred to Mason's remarks, "An honorable gentleman has asked,
Will you put the body of the state in prison? How is it between in-
dependent states? If a government refuses to do justice to individuals
war is the consequence. Is this the bloody alternative to which we are
85. 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES at 554.
86. Id. at 555.
87. Id. at 557. The Burger Court quoted Marshall's discussion of the state/citizen clause. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Marshall was only discussing state-law based causes of action. When Marshall was Chief Justice
in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the Court addressed the question of the elev-
enth amendment's effect on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over a Virginia criminal con-
viction. The Court held that a writ of error brought against the Virginia court was not a suit against
the state. The Court continued:
But should we in this be mistaken, the error does not affect the case now before the Court.
If this writ of error be a suit in the sense of the 11 th amendment, it is not a suit com-
menced, or prosecuted by citizens of another State, or by a citizen or subject of any foreign
State. It is not within the amendment, but is governed entirely by the constitution as
originally framed, and we have already seen, that in its origins, the judicial power was
extended to all cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United States without
respect to parties.
Id. at 412.
Marshall's earlier statements are only reconcilable with Cohens if one recognizes that article III
extended the judicial power to two types of cases-one based on party status, the other based on the
substantive issues-and that the eleventh amendment only affected party based jurisdiction. Accord,
Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1035; Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 295-99 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Gibbons, supra note 24, at 2004.
88. In a remarkable era, Edmund Randolph was a remarkable man. In the 1770s at the age of
twenty-three he had been a member of Virginia's State Constitutional Convention. He served as the
state's attorney general. Later as Attorney General of the United States under George Washington,
he argued the position which the Supreme Court adopted in Chisholm. See BOWEN, supra note 69,
at 37-39; Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 419-21.
89. BOWEN, supra note 69, at 263.
90. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES at 207.
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referred?" 91He further concluded that the state/citizen diversity clause
conferred jurisdiction not only when the states were plaintiffs as Madison
and Marshall opined, but also when they were defendants.92 Randolph's
statements thus indicate that, contrary to the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements in Edelman,93 Madison's and Marshall's views did not rep-
resent all of the Ratifiers'.
2. Hamilton's The Federalist No. 81
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison wrote the eighty-
five articles which made up The Federalist in order to persuade citizens
of New York, a center of anti-federalist discontent, to adopt the Consti-
tution. 94 None of New York's delegates to the Philadelphia Convention
had officially signed the Constitution.95
In a leading anti-federalist pamphlet of the period, one critic argued
that the state/citizen diversity clause would completely displace the
power of the state courts.96 Hamilton addressed the attacks expressed in
this and other articles in six papers which examined the judiciary, The
Federalist Nos. 78-83.
In The Federalist No. 80 Hamilton examined article III, section 2.9 7
He stated that the state/citizen diversity clause rested on the "plain
proposition, that the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the dispo-
sal of apart."9 He argued that the federal courts ought to have jurisdic-
tion over all cases involving a foreign citizen in order to prevent
international unrest99 and further recognized that a foreign citizen's case
could turn on a construction of "municipal law" but was unclear about
91. Id. at 573.
92. Id. Although Randolph did possess a great deal of stature during the ratification period, see
supra note 88, the Burger Court never cited or examined his statements. But see Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 268-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing Randolph's arguments).
93. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671 n. 9; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
94. THE FEDERALIST LXXXIV - LXXXV (J. Hamilton ed. 1869) [hereinafter THE
FEDERALIST].
95. Robert Yates, John Lansing, Jr., and Hamilton were New York's delegates to the Philadel-
phia Convention. Yates and Lansing left the Convention in July. Hamilton had left in June, re-
turning to the convention from time to time over the summer. When he signed the Constitution in
September he apparently did so without his state's authorization. BOWEN, supra note 69, at 115.
96. Brutus No. 13, in THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 237-38 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds.
1987).
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 587.
98. Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 589.
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whether federal courts would apply this law."00 He also announced that
the state/citizen diversity clause was "not less essential to the peace of
the union.... ."I" Hamilton found support for the state/citizen diversity
jurisdiction in the Privileges and Immunities clause.102 He maintained
that
[t]o serve the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion
and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to
that tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be im-
partial, between the different states and their citizens, and which, owing its
official existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspi-
cious to the principles on which it is founded. 103
The Federalist No. 81 primarily explored article III, section 1, which
vested the judicial power "in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."' 4
The bulk of this essay allayed fears that the federal judiciary would usurp
all legislative functions. In what Hamilton expressly labeled a "digres-
sion" from the paper's subject, he examined an antifederalist suggestion
"that an assignment of the public securities of one state to the citizens of
another, would enable them to prosecute that state in the federal courts
for the amount of those securities."1 ° He answered that states retained
their sovereignty unless they gave it up in the "plan of the conven-
tion." 0 6 He found, though, that the constitution did not divest the states
of the privilege to pay their debts in their own way "free from every
constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith."' 10 7
He concluded that the "contracts between a nation and an individual are
only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension
to a compulsive force."' 08 Undoubtedly the antifederalist suggestion
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Privileges and Immunities clause states: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
103. THE FEDERALIST, No. 80 at 590.
104. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
105. Id. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 at 601.
106. Id. at 602.
107. Id.
108. Id. Hamilton, like Marshall, Madison and Mason, was writing about state law causes of
action. Arguably the antifederalists only feared that the diversity clauses in article III gave the
federal courts power to create substantive law. See notes 74-92, 96 and accompanying text. Justice
Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) demonstrated how well grounded these
fears were. Swift held that the decisions of state tribunals concerning commercial law did not bind
the federal courts sitting under diversity jurisdiction. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
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Hamilton addressed in this context was a question of state contract law.
Implicitly then Hamilton suggested that the state/citizen clause, while
authorizing a federal court to obtain jurisdiction, did not grant the courts
the power to usurp state contract law under diversity jurisdiction.1 ° 9
3. The Profound Shock of Chisholm v. Georgia
In Chisholm v. Georgia11° the Supreme Court ruled that it held juris-
diction over an action in assumpsit by a South Carolinian against the
State of Georgia and ordered the state to discharge its debt. The Court
released its opinion on February 18, 1793, and within five years the states
ratified the eleventh amendment."' The proponents of the "profound
shock" theory argue that the speed with which the states passed the
amendment demonstrated that the Ratifiers believed that the Constitu-
tion guaranteed a rule of state sovereign immunity. 12 This section con-
siders that assumption in light of the various proposed amendments and
of other political forces which may have led to the proposal and the rati-
fication of the eleventh amendment.
Many states reacted angrily to the Court's decision in Chisholm at
least in part because of their considerable indebtedness." 3 One day after
the Court's decision, a member of the House of Representatives proposed
the following amendment:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the
judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the author-
ity of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons whether a
citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic or corpo-
rate, whether within or without the United States. 1
14
overruled Swift. In examining the statements of Marshall, Madison and Hamilton, the Burger Court
never considered the relevance of the Erie branch of federal law even though it deals with the same
article and section of the Constitution.
109. Cf. Justice Brennan's description of Hamilton's views:
In the cases arising under state law that would find their way into federal court under the
state-citizen diversity clause, a defense of state sovereign immunity would be as valid in
federal court as it would be in state court. The States retained their full sovereign authority
over state-created causes of action, as they did over their traditional sources of revenue.
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 276-77.
110. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
111. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 20-25 and cases cited therein.
113. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1059; Jacobs, supra note 8, at 57; 1 WARREN, supra note 51, at
99. Another reason for the states' anger is that Chisholm was incorrectly reported as a suit on behalf
of a British creditor. See supra note 8.
114. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1058-59. Some authors dispute whether anyone ever proposed
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
152 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:135
The next day another resolution proposed the following: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not extend to any suits in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.""'  The
Second Congress tabled both proposals and adjourned on March 4,
1793, without reconsidering the problem." 6
The Third Congress convened in December 1793. On January 2, 1794
an unidentified senator introduced what became the eleventh amend-
ment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another State or by citizens or
subjects of any foreign state."' 1 7 The Senate and House overwhelmingly
passed the amendment after rejecting two other proposals." 8
Between the adjournment of the Second Congress and the convening
of the Third, a number of forces were threatening the unity of the new
nation. While the Chisholm Court's opinion certainly aroused dissatis-
faction, these other forces also played an important role in persuading
the Federalist Congress to propose the eleventh amendment.
this form of the amendment at all. Fletcher's source is a newspaper and he notes that the amend-
ment does not appear in the Annals of Congress. Id. at 1059 n. 116. Judge Gibbons traced the first
account of the proposal to I WARREN, supra note 51, at 101. Gibbons points out though that no
evidence of the resolution exists in the National Archives. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1926 n. 186.
Professor Jacobs does not mention this proposal.
115. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1927. Fletcher, supra note 29 at 1059; Jacobs, supra note 8, at
65.
116. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1927.
117. Id. at 1932 (quoting 4.Annals of Cong. 25 (1794)).
118. Gibbons, supra note 25 at 1932-34. The Senate passed the resolution 23-2; the House voted
81-9. The first defeated proposal would have exempted from the amendment cases arising under
treaties of the United States. After this rejection an unidentified senator proposed the following:
The Judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and equity in which one
of the United States is a party; but no suit shall be prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, where the
cause of action shall have arisen before the ratification of this amendment.
When the senators and representatives were constructing the text of the eleventh amendment, they
were not working with an empty record. A number of state conventions had proposed amendments
to article III, § 2. The Virginia convention proposed that the judicial power "shall extend to no case
where the cause of action shall originate before the ratification of the Constitution .... " 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES at 661. A New York proposal extended even further: "iThat nothing in the constitution
now under consideration contained, is to be construed to authorize any suit to be brought against
any state, in any manner whatever." 2 ELLIOT's DEBATE at 409. According to Judge Gibbons these
amendments suggest that the Ratifiers believed that article III, § 2 extended to suits where states
were defendants or else they would not have offered amendments. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1918.
Compare Justice Powell's statements, supra note 28.
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In April 1793, one month after the Second Congress' adjournment,
news first reached America that revolutionaries in France had beheaded
King Louis XVI and had declared war on Great Britain, Holland and
Spain."1 9 At the same time a French emissary, Citizen Genet, landed in
America to advance the new government's interests.1 20 The French
hoped that the United States would accelerate its payments of debt owed
to France. Furthermore, they tried to enlist America's aid in harassing
British and Spanish holdings in North America.1 21 President Washing-
ton, however, firmly rejected Genet's advances as the president greatly
feared war with the British. Instead Washington issued a proclamation
of neutrality over Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson's objections that
only Congress had the power to issue such a decree.122
The French intrigue infiltrated the state legislatures which were con-
vening to consider the Chisholm decision. In September 1793 Massachu-
setts called for a constitutional convention to consider the amendability
to suit of the states in federal courts. Virginia followed suit in Novem-
ber. By the time the Third Congress met in December, seven other states
were considering such a resolution. By January New York's legislature
began debating the issue. If New York and the seven other states had
adopted convention resolutions, then Article V of the Constitution would
have forced Congress to call one.123
This backdrop of French connivance, of a perceived threat of war with
Great Britain and of state proposals for a new constitutional convention,
in addition to the "shock" of the decision in Chisholm, persuaded the
Federalist-dominated Congress to pass the eleventh amendment to the
states. 124 Chisholm alone probably had not brought about the event.
The overriding concern of the Congress could have been the fear that the
states would call for a new constitutional convention rather than a desire
to restore an original understanding of state sovereign immunity from all
claims. After all, the state debates on the diversity clauses focused on
119. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1927-28.
120. Id. at 1928.
121. Id. at 1929. Also, the French emissary hoped to hold America to its promise in the Treaty
of Alliance with France to guarantee "forever against all other powers... the present possessions of
the crown of France in North America." Id. at 1928.
122. Id. at 1929. Washington refused to call Congress for fear that the mounting tension would
force a declaration of war with the British. Id., (citing A. DECONDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE:
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY UNDER GEORGE WASHINGTON, 178-80, 187-90 (1958)).
123. Id. at 1930-31.
124. Judge Gibbons also credits these disturbances with having played an important role in con-
vincing a Federalist Congress to propose the amendment. Id. at 1931-32, 2003-04.
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war debts and land grants.125 Thus, the eleventh amendment may only
have allowed the new states to avoid old debts and land grants in order to
dissuade state legislators from calling a convention during a period of
crisis.
III. THE BURGER COURT'S USE OF THE RATIFIERS' STATEMENTS
The crucial historical question for the Burger Court was whether the
Ratifiers believed that the constitution dictated a rule of state sovereign
immunity.12 6 The Court correctly identified the Ratifiers' views as con-
trolling.127 But, though it purported to examine the historical basis of
the eleventh amendment, the Court only recited the statements of Mar-
shall, Madison and Hamilton and gave a scanty background of Chisholm
v. Georgia.128 In 1985, when Justice Brennan set forth an extensive re-
view to buttress his argument that no constitutional rule of state sover-
eign immunity existed, the Court majority of Chief Justice Burger,
Justices Rehnquist, Powell, White and O'Connor responded: "The "new
evidence," discovered by the dissent [has] been available to historians
and Justices of this Court for almost two centuries. Viewed in isolation
some of it is subject to varying interpretations." 129
The Court implicitly made several assumptions when it used the state-
ments of Marshall, Madison and Hamilton. First, it dismissed the fears
of prominent antifederalists as irrelevant to the constitution's interpreta-
tion.130 Second, it disregarded the views of the noteworthy federalist,
Edmund Randolph. 3 1 Finally, the Court imputed these statements not
125. See supra notes 66-108 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 28 and cases cited therein.
127. Although the Ratifiers' intention is in principle controlling, some writers argue that the
difficulty of ascertaining their intent leaves little choice but to accept the intention of the Framers as
reflecting it. E.g., Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353, 375 n. 30 (1981).
The Framers, though, did not substantially debate the state-citizen diversity clauses of article III,
§ 2. The only discussions occurred in the state ratifying conventions and in pamphlets such as THE
FEDERALIST. See generally, Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1045-54.
128. For the Court's study of the historical basis of the eleventh amendment, see supra notes 49.
62 and accompanying text.
129. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238 n.2.
130. For several of the antifederalist views see supra notes 73-78, 83-84, 96 and accompanying
text. See generally the material collected in THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION (P. Kurland and R.
Lerner 1987). Justice Brennan stated that the Court should examine the ideas of the antifederalists
because the federalist's "fervent desire for ratification" might have led them to downplay controver-
sial aspects of the constitution. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 270 n.20.
131. For a discussion of Randolph's statements at the Virginia Convention, see supra notes 88-92
and accompanying text.
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only to the whole Virginia convention, but also to every other ratifier in
every other state.1 3
2
The Burger Court also assigned a meaning to these statements which,
considered in their entirety, they did not possess. Marshall, Madison and
Mason agreed that federal courts should be the arbiter of treaties. 133
When Madison and Marshall made their statements that individuals
would not have the power to call states into federal courts it was in the
context of the relationship between the state/citizen diversity clause and
the western Virginia lands disputes.1 34 These disputes concerned state
real property law and the Paris Peace Treaty. In the cases of suits under
the Peace Treaty, both the antifederalists and the proponents of the Con-
stitution seem to have agreed that article III should permit suits against
the states.1 35
In The Federalist No. 80, Hamilton argued that federal courts must
have jurisdiction over suits by foreign citizens to ensure international
tranquility. 136 He further declared that the jurisdiction over state/citizen
diversity cases would guarantee the full effect of the Privileges and Im-
munities clause.'37 But, in The Federalist No. 81 where he declared that
the states were sovereign, he was referring to suits against states under
state contract law.1 38
On their face the statements of Madison, Marshall and Hamilton did
not directly address the question before the Burger Court, whether the
eleventh amendment barred an individual's federal question suit against
a state. In order to find that these statements required state sovereign
immunity from all suits the Burger Court attributed what one semiolo-
gist calls a "rich" semantic intent to the words. A "rich" semantic inten-
tion supplies the speaker's mind with a wide variety of reasons for
making a statement, which may aid a court interpreting specific lan-
guage.1 39 Here, the Burger Court intimated that Marshall, Madison and
132. Before citing Madison, Marshall and Hamilton in Edelman, the Court stated that their
views prevailed at the time of ratification. 415 U.S. at 660 n.9.
133. See supra notes 74, 80 & 85 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 81 and 86 and accompanying text. See also note 70 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the land disputes.
135. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Mason's views on this point were contradictory.
At one point he stated that the federal judiciary ought to have the power to hear cases arising under
the treaties. At the same time he begrudged the British creditors right to sue under the treaty. Id.
136. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
139. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 340 (1985). A
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Hamilton were arguing for a broad rule of sovereign immunity from all
suits."4 The Court never justified this claim.
The Burger Court also maintained that Chisholm v. Georgia shocked
the nation into passing the eleventh amendment. 141 The Court implicitly
found that the nation believed that all states were immune from suit and
that the swift ratification affirmed this general understanding. The Court
thereby ignored other possible political forces. 142 This narrow view of
history, coupled with the Court's broad reading of Madison, Marshall
and Hamilton, distorted its interpretation of the eleventh amendment.
IV. ERIE RAILROAD AND THE RATIFIERS
By using a narrow and simplistic version of the historical events sur-
rounding the adoption of both the Constitution and the eleventh amend-
ment, the Burger Court avoided the complex question of whether the
doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 13 should have affected its inter-
"spare" semantic intention offers only a limited number of possible meanings. A rich semantic in-
tention offers a wide array of possible meanings. Professor Moore maintains that attributing either
rich or spare semantic intentions to the speaker is not useful as an interpretive tool. Id. at 340-47.
The Burger Court's attribution of a "rich" semantic intention to Madison and Marshall was com-
pounded by Court's implicit conclusion that the Virginia convention ratified the Constitution with
the belief of this broader intention. In doing so the Court disregarded the fact that Virginia pro-
posed an amendment to article III which would have only forbidden causes of action against the
states which had arisen before the ratification of the Constitution. See supra note 118.
In another context, Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the Edelman decision, recognized this very
problem of searching for the intent of a legislature: "Inquiries into [motives] or purposes are a
hazardous matter. [What] motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessar-
ily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork." Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,228 (1985) (citation omitted).
Finally, the Court's use of Madison's and Marshall's statements may be undermined by Governor
Edmund Randolph's declaration at the end of the convention:
Mr. Chairman, one parting word I humbly supplicate.
The suffrage which I shall give in favor of the Constitution will be ascribed, by malice, to
motives unknown to my breast. But, although for every other act of my life I shall seek
refuge in the mercy of God, for this I request his justice only. Lest, however, some future
annalist should, in the spirit of party vengeance, deign to mention my name, let him recite
these truths-that I went to the federal Convention with the strongest affection for the
Union; that I acted there in full conformity with this affection; that I refused to subscribe,
because I had, as Istill have, objections to the Constitution, and wished a free inquiry into its
merits; and that the accession of eight states reduced our deliberations to the single ques-
tion of Union or no Union. (emphasis added).
3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 55, at 652.
140. 415 U.S. at 660, n.9.
141. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of some political forces
which.may have shaped the proposal of the eleventh amendment.
143. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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pretation of the ratifying conventions. The Court in Erie had stated that
the Constitution compelled its decision. 1" Thus, Erie restored a consti-
tutional balance which the Supreme Court itself had upset for almost one
hundred years. Plausibly, Erie restored what the Framers and Ratifiers
intended as the meaning of the diversity clauses.145
Stated simply, Erie required that federal courts sitting in diversity ap-
ply state statutory and common law in questions of substantive law.'46
Antifederalists like George Mason and Patrick Henry, afraid of a Swift-
type 147 interpretation, clearly believed that the diversity clauses were
conferring to the federal courts the power to formulate the law governing
state obligations in areas like debt and contract. 148 They feared that the
federal judiciary would swallow up the state legislatures' power to create
the law which governed their citizens.' 49 By reference to various state
law causes of action, Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton were reassuring
these dissenters that the federal courts would discern and apply state
law. 150
Erie thus appears to have restored what some Ratifiers intended as the
meaning of the diversity clauses. The decision in Chisholm, 151 therefore,
contradicted this view of article III, section 2 which Erie later pro-
pounded and which Madison, Marshall and Hamilton seem to have ad-
vocated. History would have been different if Erie had preceded
Chisholm. In Chisholm, Georgia, the situs of the contract, would have
been the source of the substantive law. Under Erie, a federal court sitting
in diversity would have applied Georgia's rule of sovereign immunity,
allowing Georgia to prevail. 152
144. Id. at 79-80. For a discussion of the constitutional basis of Erie, see supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text.
145. Cf. Friendly, In Praise of ERIE-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
383, 392-98 (1964); R. BERGER, FEDERALISM 179 (1987).
146. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
147. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842). See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
148. While Mason and Henry did not speak in "Erie terms" they voiced an important concern of
Erie: That the federal courts would swallow the state courts. See supra notes 70-75, 80-81 and
accompanying text.
149. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
150. For the most part, state law causes of action served as the background for the debate in
Virginia. In their discussions on the Peace Treaty of 1783 the debaters did not resolve their conflict-
ing interpretations. See supra notes 66-68 & 83 and accompanying text. When Hamilton addressed
the issue of state sovereignty under the diversity clause, he was addressing the state law question of a
state's obligations for debt it had issued. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
151. Chisholm v. Georgia 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
152. This assumes that the federal courts would find that Georgia's rule of state sovereign immu-
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While Erie would have dictated a different result in Chisholm, it also
holds importance for a separate reason. Erie vitiated fears such as those
of Mason and Henry that the diversity clauses would authorize the fed-
eral courts to swallow state legislatures and courts. If Erie had somehow
existed during the conventions, then the antifederalists would have had
little need to pursue their criticisms of the diversity clauses. If they had
stayed silent, Madison, Marshall and Hamilton would not have had the
opportunity to respond. The Burger Court's historical documentation
for its eleventh amendment decisions would not have existed. Because of
these problems the Court should have considered how to incorporate its
present understanding of the Constitution into its use of the Ratifiers'
statements.
V. INCORPORATING THE RATIFIERS' STATEMENTS INTO
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
The Burger Court's interpretation of the Ratifiers' statements and of
the history of Chisholm v. Georgia calls into consideration the methodol-
ogy of using history to construe the Constitution.153 When the Court
quoted the statements of Madison, Marshall and Hamilton it did not at-
tempt to place them within the specific contexts of the state conventions
or the other Federalists respectively, nor within the broader cultural con-
text of late 18th century America.154 At the same time, the Burger Court
failed to see that the Chisholm ruling itself, notwithstanding the eleventh
amendment, could not have existed after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. In
order to make its decisions more principled and to give more rational
nity was substantive law. Under Erie, as refined in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), federal
courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law, but retain federal rules of procedure.
153. Historical investigation and legal reasoning are seldom good partners, as Professor Fletcher
has stated:
History and law frequently make an awkward marriage, for legal analysis typically selects
and molds historical facts to serve its own purposes to a degree that is unknown to conven-
tional history. Whether legal analysis suffers as a result may be an open question, but it is
clear that history frequently does.
Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1037.
154. The Constitution derives its "force and meaning from a larger political and moral cul-
ture .... " Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 489, 508 (1985). See also
Gumperz, The Speech Community, in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 219 (P. Giglioli ed. 1972)
("verbal interaction is a social process in which utterances are selected in accordance with socially
recognized norms."). For historical examinations of the period see generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEO-
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effect to the Ratifiers' language, the Court should consider the following
procedure.
First, if the Court chooses to attach significance to the statements of
the members of a state ratifying convention, it should carefully examine
the record of the whole convention. The Court should focus on the dif-
ferences among the Ratifier's positions and interpret these within the nar-
row context in which the Ratifiers spoke. The Court should articulate
whether the statements of the Ratifiers dispose of the issue before it or
only if they inform the debate with more meaning. While reviewing
these statements, the Court should hesitate to ascribe to the Ratifiers a
rich semantic intent155 because this opportunity often has led the Court
to reconstruct the colonial period in its own image.
Second, the Court should review pamphlets, letters, and broader histo-
ries of the period in order to give meaning to the words and phrases
which the Ratifiers used. The Court must recognize that the Ratifiers
spoke within the broader context of their social period.'56 Indeed the
concept of sovereignty seems to have possessed a different meaning in
their time.157
155. The Court can only apply the text if its purposes are usefully understood, Monaghan, supra
note 127, at 375. By inferring a rich semantic intention, the Court defeats the search for the Ra-
tifiers' belief by not allowing their statements to stand alone. The text's purposes then include any
motive the Court desires to find in the Ratifiers' statements.
156. Translation of one nation's language into another is not the sole source of misunderstanding
of meaning. The founders choice of words could today possess a very different meaning. For in-
stance, Alexander Hamilton stated that it was "inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be ame-
nable to the suit of an individual.... ." See supra note 58 and accompanying text. But what meaning
did the word sovereignty hold for Hamilton? How do modern Supreme Court Justices reconcile
their conception of the meaning of the term with the founders'? Simply to recite a statement which
Hamilton delivered two hundred years ago, without placing it in some kind of historical/cultural
context, divests the message of meaning. It is, as the semiologist Roland Barthes states, an "illusion
to consider on equal status the language spoken and the language heard, as if they were the
same . R. Barthes, Pax Culturalis, in THE RUSTLE OF LANGUAGE 102 (R. Howard trans.
1986).
157. British common law is the source of sovereign immunity with the maxim "The King can do
no wrong." But the documents of the colonial period tend to establish the absence of any expecta-
tion that the various charter governments were immune from suit. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1895-
99. Indeed to impute such an anti-democratic formula to the Framers and Ratifiers runs counter to
their general trend of creating a new world divested of the old one's corruption. See generally,
COMMAGER, supra note 73, at 162-235. Before the Declaration of Independence no colony had
pretensions of sovereignty and the word "states" does not appear in that document. At the Philadel-
phia Convention though, George Washington wrote that the word "states" was like a "monster."
BOWEN, supra note 69, at 32-34.
In addition to not examining the colonists' understandings about sovereignty, the Burger Court
did not consider the influences of the "peculiar institution" of slavery on concepts of state sover-
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Third, when the Court finds a conflict in the Ratifiers' statements, it
should compare the differing views with present constitutional under-
standing. Where Court decisions have subsequently clarified the misun-
derstanding in the constitutional text, the Court should carefully
incorporate this view into its interpretation of the Ratifiers. 58
Finally, if after applying these steps, the Court cannot reconcile the
Ratifiers' views or incorporate present understanding into the debate, it
must choose to base its ruling on other constitutional grounds. In other
words, the Court should not rest its decisions on its view of the historical
significance of a speaker."5 9 Instead the Court's decision should fit
within the Court's construction of the constitution as a whole.' 60
This model suggests that when the Burger Court examined the state-
ments of Marshall, Madison and Hamilton, it should have recognized
that they were only three of many spokesmen in the ratification pro-
cess 161 and that they were merely discussing issues of state law.1 62 In-
stead, the Court ascribed to their words a rich semantic intent to bar all
suits against states regardless of their basis in federal or state law. 163 The
eignty. The state sovereignty theories of Mason, Madison and Jefferson directly evolved into the
secessionist doctrine of John Randolph and John C. Calhoun. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER LAW 211-13 (1982). The Court should consider whether Federalists like Madison,
Marshall and Hamilton made their statements to allay slave owners' fears that the proposed federal
government would abolish slavery.
158. A number of the Ratifiers' statements suggest they believed that the diversity clauses con-
ferred on the federal judiciary the power to fashion substantive law. See supra note 90. The
Supreme Court should consider whether the Erie Doctrine affects the relevance of these statements
and if so in what manner.
159. The myth of the Founding Fathers is a powerful one. See generally, J.0. ROnERTSON,
AMERICAN MYTH, AMERICAN REALITY, 54-71 (1980). In retrospect, a person like Hamilton or
Marshall may seem to rise to greater heights than others. The audience at the time of the ratifica-
tion, however, may have held Edmund Randolph or Patrick Henry in equal esteem.
160. The Burger Court specifically linked its eleventh amendment doctrine with the Court's con-
cern for the role of the states in the federal system. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
at 238 n.2. Exhaustive examination of the Ratifiers' statements indicates that they were at best
uncertain about the meaning of the diversity clauses and indeed all of article III § 2. See supra notes
66-108 and accompanying text. This uncertainty would not prevent the Court from adopting its
view of the important role the states play. The Court's failure lay only in the cursory manner in
which it used history.
161. See supra notes 66-108 and accompanying text for an outline of the broader context in
which Madison, Marshall and Hamilton spoke.
162. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state law basis of the
debates in Virginia and Hamilton's FEDERALIST.
163. See supra note 134 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of rich semantic
intent.
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Court should have accepted that the Ratifiers did not directly answer the
issue of federal question suits against the states.
Second, the Court should have studied broader histories of the period.
Such an examination could have revealed more thoroughly what the Ra-
tifiers meant when they spoke of sovereignty. In all likelihood the term
held many meanings. To some it represented a return to the anti-demo-
cratic monarchies of the Old World. To others it reflected an idea that
states possessed certain powers which the proposed federal government
could not take away. This latter concept flowered into the secessionist
movements in the 1800s."' The question the Court should have ad-
dressed was whether either concept of sovereignty holds any strength in
the twentieth century.
By not examining histories of the period, the Court too easily accepted
the "profound shock" theory.165 The Burger Court failed to consider
other factors such as the passing of the Peace Treaty of 1783, the French
intrigues to draw the United States into war, and the Federalist Party's
fear of a second constitutional convention. 66 The Burger Court should
have acknowledged that the Chisholm decision was not the sole impetus
for the eleventh amendment.
Third, the Court should have considered the relevance of Erie '67 to the
eleventh amendment. At the very least Erie introduced into the debate
an interesting puzzle. In all likelihood the decision made the Ratifiers'
discussion of the diversity clauses irrelevant. In light of Erie, the Burger
Court should have realized that the Ratifiers' views did not answer the
question of whether a citizen could bring a federal question suit against a
state.
The Burger Court should have based its decisions on other as aspects
of the Constitution. An easy solution for the Court would have been to
rule that the federal judiciary cannot allow suits against states without
express Congressional authority to do so. 68 This brief rationale presents
164. See supra notes 156-57 for a discussion of the sovereignty concept in the era of the
ratification.
165. For an outline of the "profound shock" theory, see supra, note 113 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
167. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
168. By the rule of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), Congress may authorize suits
against states using its powers under fourteenth amendment § 5. Logically the Court could extend
this rule to allow federal question suits against states only when Congress authorized such actions
regardless of the eleventh amendment.
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a defensible ground for the Burger Court decisions. The Ratifiers' state-
ments and the history of the eleventh amendment unfortunately do not.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the federalist merits of the Burger Court's doctrine of state
sovereign immunity, the Court's use of history and the Ratifiers' state-
ments was misleading. While legal and historical investigation certainly
diverge at points, the Court should have endeavored to support its histor-
ical assertions with fact. When the Court chose to adopt the intention of
the Ratifiers as controlling, it should have committed itself to a compre-
hensive review of the history of the ratification period. Instead the Court
cited three naked statements out of context.
The history of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution is rele-
vant to constitutional interpretation, but only after a thorough examina-
tion of that history. In the future the Court should not cite statements of
the Ratifiers without exploring the specific textual context and the rela-
tive cultural meaning. The Court must undertake this difficult task in
order to maintain defensible principles of constitutional law and to pre-
vent the manipulation of the Ratifiers' statements.
Stephen P. Magowan
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